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Introduction
popularized "invisible handshakes," or implicit contracts, as a possible source of price rigidity. They have most often been explored in the context of wage setting in labor markets (Rosen, 1985 (Rosen, , 1994 . However, implicit contracts may plausibly exist in consumer goods markets as well.
1 To our knowledge, however, no studies offer direct evidence of this. 2 We offer the first direct and, in fact, quite explicit evidence of such an implicit contract. The evidence comes from the market for Coca-Cola.
Starting in 1886, in the bottle or at the fountain, 6.5oz of Coca-Cola retailed for 5¢.
With remarkably few deviations, this nominal price did not adjust for over 60 years. The nickel Coke did not entirely disappear from US markets until 1959-over 70 years! During this time there was also remarkable quality rigidity with less than one change per decade on average to the "Secret Formula" (Levy and Young, 2004) . We argue that an implicit contract with consumers was associated with both the price and quality rigidity.
The lack of studies offering direct evidence of implicit contracts is not surprising as they are "tacit agreements that are not written down [and] the theory does not predict literal price rigidity, but only that prices are relatively insensitive to fluctuations in demand" (Blinder, et al., 1988, p. 152) . As "hard" data are hard to come by, we adopt a narrative approach (Romer and Romer, 1989, 1994; Zbaracki, et al., 2004) .
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The Coca-Cola price rigidity is exceptional relative to the evidence reported on US prices. 4 Cecchetti (1986) reports that magazine prices change only every 3-6 years on average. Using business-to-business industrial price data, Carlton (1986) finds that prices remain unchanged for several years. Kashyap (1995) studies catalog prices of 12 retail goods for 35 years and reports an average duration of 15 months. Blinder, et al. (1988) , based on survey evidence from firms, conclude that, on average, prices lag supply or demand changes by 3 months. 5 Recent studies using micro-level transaction price data report similar figures (e.g., Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008; Nakamura and Zerom, 2010) . 6 In comparison, the Coca-Cola price rigidity lasted at least an order of magnitude longer.
The Coca-Cola Company is one of the most successful and recognized producers of a consumer good in the world. During the time period we study, the soft drink industry and the Coca-Cola Company itself were non-negligible parts of the US economy. For example, in 1945 the bottled non-alcoholic carbonated beverage industry was 0.26% of US GDP (Riley, 1942, p. 343) . The Company had a roughly 50% market share in that industry, making its own contribution an economically significant 0.13% of GDP.
In Levy and Young (2004) we argue that an explicit contract between Coca-Cola and its bottlers was a source of price rigidity. The contract fixed the price of Coca-Cola syrup to bottlers. Given this, the Company could increase profits only by selling more syrup.
Thus the Company pursued a policy of retail price maintenance. 7 The contract, however, its member EU central banks report that EU prices tend to be more rigid than US prices. Álvarez, et al, (2006) , Dhyne, et al. (2006) , and Levy and Smets (2010) summarize these studies. 5 Levy et al. (2002) , Genesove (2003) and Young and Blue (2007) document price rigidities for, respectively, orange juice products (about a month), apartment rental rates (a few months), and goods sold through Sears catalogs (over two years in some cases). Some studies, however, report more frequent price changes (e.g., Levy, et al., 1997; Dutta, et al., 1999; Dutta, et al., 2002; Bills and Klenow, 2004) . 6 See also Goldberg and Hellerstein (2007, 2013) , Anderson and Simester (2010) , Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010, 2011) , Chevalier and Kashyap (2011), and Anderson, et al. (2012) . 7 Two technology-based factors help to explain the continuation of the nickel price beyond 1921. First, the vending machines with nickel-only capability and limited change-making technology imposed a constraint on price adjustment. Second, the smallest price increase compatible with consumers using a single coin was 100%. A monetary transaction technology for smaller price adjustments, keeping consumer "inconvenience costs" low, was not available. Daly (1970) documents widespread consumer inconvenience costs due to a small change shortage in Brazil. Selgin (2008) documents how in late 1700s UK private coinage flourished in response to a shortage of smaller denomination coins. In Knotek (2008) , firms incorporate convenience lasted until 1921 and cannot explain the additional 38 years of price rigidity.
Here we address the presence of an implicit contract between Coca-Cola and its consumers. We argue that it was an important source of the price rigidity during 19211959. However, we stress that the explicit contract with bottlers and the implicit contract with consumers are related: the former contributed to and reinforced the latter.
We argue that the implicit contract included the promise of a constant price and constant quality. We document the dedication to the 6.5oz serving of the Secret Formula.
Over a 73-year period, only seven changes in the Secret Formula occurred. Of those, we argue that only one could have been substituted for by a price adjustment.
In section 2 we document the Coca-Cola price and quality rigidities and discuss changes in economic conditions and marginal costs. In section 3 we describe implicit contracts and the problems that they can solve, and show that the Company perceived such problems as important. In section 4 we present our evidence of an implicit contract.
In section 5 we address the link between the implicit and explicit contracts. We consider some alternative explanations for the nickel Coke in section 6 and conclude in section 7.
The Coca-Cola Episode: Price and Quality Rigidity
The nickel Coke began in 1886 with an Atlanta peddler of patent medicines. John Stith
Pemberton had the ingenious idea to sell Coca-Cola in 5¢ fountain servings rather than in 75¢ or $1 medicine bottles. The world's most famous soft drink was born. If he were alive, Pemberton might well be shocked to learn that the nickel Coke remained largely uniform for over 60 years and did not disappear for over 70 years.
Whether in a bottle or at a soda fountain, 6.5oz Coca-Cola retailed for 5¢. The into pricing decisions. The model can account for the dynamics of US newspaper prices. Knotek (2011) extends the evidence to convenience store products. Eckard (2007) argues that relatively few "even" price points reduced cashier transaction costs.
remarkably few exceptions were unpopular with consumers. As late as 1951, Fortune magazine reported that Louisiana dealers, seeking to pass on cost increases to consumers, had to backtrack as consumers threatened to "take all their business elsewhere […]" "Everybody knows Coke sells for a nickel -look at the back of this week's Life" (p. 129).
During the more than 70 years of price rigidity, Coca-Cola also exhibited remarkable quality rigidity. Schaeffer and Bateman (1985) document merely six changes in the Secret Formula from 1886 to 1960. We found evidence of one additional, temporary change. Two of the changes were exogenously imposed. All but one of the other changes were attempts to keep quality unchanged. Since we argue that constant quality was a part of the implicit contract, we elaborate briefly on each Formula change.
The first documented change was an addition of glycerin in 1889 to prevent the syrup from turning rancid in storage. The syrup was also altered by "adding essential ingredients and by taking others out of the Pemberton Formula" in order to make the ingredients more "compatible" with each other (Schaeffer and Bateman, 1985, p. 4) . By all accounts, these changes were made to prevent perishing and ensure constant quality at different fountain locations.
In 1899 the second documented change occurred. The Company decided to prepare two syrups-one for fountains and one for bottles. The syrup for bottles contained more sugar, less water, more caramel, more citric acid, less caffeine, and more phosphoric acid (Allen, 1994, p. 9) . The goal was to ensure that the drink, at the fountain or from a bottle, had the same taste; that is, to ensure uniform quality.
The third change was the indirect result of an 1898 tax on medicines. Coca-Cola was still marketed as a medicine and a tax of $29,502 was charged, which the Company contested. At trial in 1901, Company president Asa Candler admitted under oath to Coca-Cola having "a very small trace" of cocaine. 8 The Company outsourced the preparation of "Merchandise No. 5" (containing coca leaf and kola nut extracts) to remove the cocaine completely. This change was made under exogenous threat of prosecution.
The fourth change came in 1904. The Company was using powdered sugar which carried moisture and tended to sour during transportation (Candler, 1950) . A switch to granulated sugar was made. 9 Since we find no evidence of consumers perceiving a change in quality, the two sugar types were likely perfect (or very close) substitutes.
A lawsuit brought by the USDA under the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 led to the fifth change. The 1909 lawsuit claimed Coca-Cola was "misbranded" because its name promised kola and coca but contained little of either; and it was "adulterated" by added caffeine. 10 In April 1918, the Company agreed to a settlement which included reducing the caffeine by almost two-thirds. This change was exogenously imposed.
The sixth change occurred when, in response to WWI sugar shortages and rationing, Company president Howard Candler (Asa's son) stockpiled sugar at 28¢/lb (almost four times its pre-war price). When the price of sugar then plummeted (Atlanta Georgian, February 15, 1921) the Company found itself committed to over $8 million on sugar at twice the going price (Landers, 1950 (Trial and Appeal Record, Federal Records Center, East Point, Georgia) . The company later sued the government and the tax payments were returned (Allen, 1994, p. 43) . 9 Candler agreed to switch to granulated sugar after learning that he was paying freight on the moisture. Cola Company, 1925) , and 1920 sales were about $32 million (Annual Report, 1921 (Pendergrast, 1993, p. 129 Coca-Cola had warehouses full of contracted sugar while the market price was 3¢/lb (Fortune, 1951) .
Sugar rationing was reenacted during WWII. At the worst point, producers were rationed 50% of their prewar levels (Pendergrast, 1993, p. 201) . 15 There were also "shortages of crowns, bottles, cases, gasoline, trucks, equipment, [and] manpower" (Riley, 1942, p. 86) . At the onset of WWII, the price of sugar was $0.02/lb. By the end of 14 Interestingly, there is no evidence of Coca-Cola retail prices adjusting upward during WWI when its production costs soared, although during the postwar inflation there were isolated reports of retailers charging 6¢ or 7¢ for a Coke. Note that the Coca-Cola Company had no direct/legal control over the price that retailers charged. Levy and Young (2004, pp. 774-777) describe in detail some of the methods and techniques the Company used to "convince" the retailers that the nickel price was in their advantage. 15 Allen (1994, p. 251) states that the number was 80 percent of prewar levels.
WWII, the price was $0.08, up by 300% (Allen, 1994, p. 276 
Implicit Contracts
Implicit contracts are "arrangements that are not legally binding but that give both sides incentives to maintain the relationship" (Okun, 1981, pp. 49-50) . 20 We argue that an implicit contract guaranteed a constant nominal price and quality of Coca-Cola and that the consumers valued this guarantee.
Economic Rationales for Implicit Contracts
Sellers and buyers may enter into implicit contracts for various reasons. First, consumers 16 WWII shortages led to temporary use of sugar substitute and decreases in caffeine and coca contents. 17 Source: The Coca-Cola Company, Fact Sheet. 18 Source: "Memorandum to: Mr. Nicholson" (Coca-Cola Company, January, 1951) and "The Price Situation" (Coca-Cola Company, February, 1951) . 19 As well, Coca-Cola began introducing various bottle sizes at various prices. 20 Such informal agreements are termed "implicit," "self-enforcing," or "relational" (Gil and Marion, 2012) . For example, Telser (1980, p. 27) refers to a "self-enforcing agreement" as one that "remains in force as long as each party believes himself to be better off by continuing the agreement than he would be by ending it. " Baker, et al. (2002, p. 39) refer to "relational contracts: informal agreements and unwritten codes of conduct that powerfully affect the behaviors of individuals within firms." may value the guarantee of a fair price. 21 There is evidence that fair prices are important to buyers. Kahneman, et al. (1986) provide survey evidence that the perceived fairness of prices is important for understanding consumer demand. In lab experiments, buyers often boycott, against their self-interest, sellers engaged in unfair price increases.
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Implicit contracts may mitigate time consistency problems in case of habit-forming goods. Sellers may attract consumers today by promising (a continuation of) low prices in the future, which can lead to dynamic inconsistency because when the future comes, firms have an incentive to raise prices (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2011 ). Consumers anticipate that by then they will be "hooked" and that refraining from paying the high prices will be difficult. While explicitly contracting on future prices with individual consumers may be prohibitively costly, entering into an implicit contract with all consumers facilitates transactions in the presence of this moral hazard.
Firms may also form implicit contracts to increase brand loyalty. Given ostensibly close substitutes, a firm's brand may convey information about hard-to-observe, but distinctive, characteristics of the good (or the "experience" of buying it from the particular firm) that differentiate it from similar goods (Telser, 1980; Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983) . Such hard-to-observe features create moral hazard problems. A brand's reputation can signal that the firm is indeed providing those characteristics. The brand then "corresponds to an implicit contract between seller and buyers whereby the former supplies high-quality experience goods" Cabral (2000, p. 659) .
A firm's brand may also insure consumers against pass-through of input cost fluctuations. Consumers may be hesitant to commit to one good exclusively if there are 21 Rotemberg (2011) develops the idea of a fair price in a model where consumers interpret price changes according to their fairness and react accordingly. In Ball and Romer's (2003) model, prices serve as a signal in a long-term relationship setting between consumers and producers, leading to infrequent price adjustments. Bils (1989) models a customer market where customers develop an attachment to a product. 22 See Fehr and Gächter (2000) , Levy, et al. (2002) , Tyran and Engelmann (2005) , and Gächter and Herrmann (2009).
close substitutes. If input costs' fluctuations are passed on in the form of price fluctuations, consumers might diversify across goods. 23 However, consumers may be willing to commit exclusively if a firm stakes its brand (its goodwill). An implicit contract is a credible commitment mechanism through which a firm can deliberately make itself vulnerable to consumer backlash if pass-through occurs.
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The discussion above assumes that consumers are fully informed about the price, or that price monitoring can be done at low cost, which seems reasonable given that CocaCola is a frequently bought small-ticket item. The inclusion of "5¢" in ads and promotional merchandise kept consumers aware of this "selling" price, making it difficult for retailers to charge a higher price without consumers noticing it.
Coca-Cola as a Candidate Good for an Implicit Contract
Based on the rationales discussed above we might expect the Coca-Cola Company to have formed an implicit contract with its consumers if Coca-Cola (1) was potentially habit-forming, (2) had ostensible close substitutes available while its distinctive attributes were difficult to observe, and (3) had relatively volatile input costs.
That Coca-Cola was potentially habit-forming seems plausible. Coca-Cola contained caffeine and, up until 1918, contained an even larger amount than it does today (Schaeffer and Bateman, 1985 Cola would market 12oz (rather than 6.5oz) bottles for a nickel during the Depression (Pendergrast, 1993, p. 193) . 30 While they were identical to Coca-Cola in several easily observable ways (e.g., brown; carbonated; liquid; sweet), Coca-Cola arguably had distinct, but difficult to observe, attributes (e.g., costly and exotic ingredients such as 26 According to Allen's (1994, p. 41) account, the buyers of Coca-Cola at soda fountains would often order the drink by asking the drugstore employee to give me "a dope" or "a shot in the arm." This is clearly suggestive of the popular attitudes and perceptions towards the drink's habit-forming properties. 27 The long and highly publicized legal-battles in which the Coca-Cola Company was involved following the government's lawsuits, have led to a spread of the popular perceptions and accusations that the drink is habit forming. The spread of these views was further aided by numerous medical experts who believed that Coke had addictive characteristics. For example, according to Allen (1994, p. 45) , Dr. J.P. Baird, who was the President of the Medical Association of Georgia, testified as the government witness during the 1901 lawsuit ("Cocaine Lawsuit 1) that "Coca-Cola definitely was habit-forming… Persons who take it freely, seem to become more or less dependent on it." In Chapter 2 titled "Dope," Allen (1994) offers a detailed account of how these popular perceptions and beliefs spread over time across the entire US. This despite the (ex-post) assessment (e.g., Benjamin, et al., 1991 ) that most of the scholarly evidence presented by both sides at these court hearings seem to have been poor science, and despite the fact that most of the final verdicts in these court-cases were in favor of the Coca-Cola Company. 28 Reproduced in the Coca-Cola Company's Advertising Copy Collection, 1916 -1919 According to National Bottlers Gazette (January 5, 1917, The Coca-Cola Company Archive), the list of imitators grew to hundreds and included "Afri-Cola, Ameri-Cola, Ala-Cola, Bolama-Cola, Cafe-de-Ola, Carbo-Cola, Candy-Kola, Capa-Cola, Chero-Cola, Christo-Cola, Coke-Ola, Coo-EE-Cola, Curo-Cola, Grap-O-Cola, Its-A-Cola, Kaffir-Kola, Kaw-Kola, Kiss-Kola, Ko-Ca-Ama, Koca-Nola, Ko-Co-Lem-A, Kokola, Klu Ko Kolo, Loco Cola, Luna Cola, Mitch-O-Cola, Mo-Cola, My Cola, Roco-Cola, Toca-Cola, Taka-Cola, Qua-Kola, Uneeda-Cola, Zero-Cola, and Zippi-Cola." Allen (1994, p. 73) lists these "counterfeit" manufacturers and offers more details about the Company's efforts to fight them. 30 "Twice as much for a nickel too, Pepsi-Cola is the drink for you." This line is from a popular 1939 Pepsi jingle that played on radio.
coca leaves and kola nuts; consistent manufacturing and bottling practices), and perhaps not less important, the cult of the Secret Formula.
Finally, while it is difficult to assess Coca-Cola production cost volatility relative to other consumer goods, we know that sugar accounted for about a third of total costs.
Sugar was subject to shortages, rationing, and large price fluctuations during both World
Wars. Furthermore, just like an undiversified portfolio, the fact that one commodity constituted a full third of costs lends itself to higher potential cost volatility.
The Coca-Cola Company's Recognition of Consumer Concerns
We argue above that Coca-Cola possessed characteristics associated with implicit contract goods. However, it was the Coca-Cola Company that formed an implicit contract with its consumers. The firm's perceptions of these characteristics and of consumers' concerns for these characteristics may be most important in this regard. (Candler, 1950) . Robert Woodruff (president, 1923 Woodruff (president, -1939 later expressed his reluctance to change the Formula "except as a matter of life and death" (italics added).
Turning to input costs, the Company knew that they were volatile. However, did the near-worshipful descriptions of the drink: e.g., "You probably will think that your son has had his head exposed to the sun too long [but] three of us guys walked ten miles to buy a case of Coca-Cola, then carried it back. You will never know how good it tasted" (Pendergrast, 1993, pp. 210-211) . 34 Woodruff made a pledge: Coke would be made available to every member of the armed forces at a nickel (Kahn, 1969, p. 84) . Company agents even sold nickels (at cost) so that soldiers could buy Coca-Cola in their accustomed manner (Coca-Cola Bottler, 1944, p. 35 ). This could not have been profitable in the short run. It is consistent with the Company perceiving its product as habit-forming and insuring its consumers against supply fluctuations.
Observable Implications of Implicit Contracts
If Coca-Cola is a good candidate product for an implicit contract, and the Coca-Cola
Company recognized this, then the observable implications would include:
 evidence of the Company having communicated a pledge to consumers;
 since it could not set the retail price directly, evidence that the Company communicated the pledge and its profitability to retailers; goodwill) backlash by reneging on the pledge;  evidence of "renegotiations"-the Company's efforts to mitigate the goodwill costs by explaining the necessity of breaking the contract.
Evidence of an Implicit Contract in the Case of Coca-Cola
Next, we present evidence that Coca-Cola's fixed nominal price and quality were part of an implicit contract between the Coca-Cola Company and its consumers. This evidence consists of advertisements, trade journal inserts, and the Company's internal documents.
Extending the Invisible Handshake to Consumers: Communicating the Pledge
A remarkable feature of this implicit contract is that the Company made it explicit in the written guarantees and assurances of millions of print ads, displays, promotional giveaway items, etc. Moreover, assurances of quality and price were often included together. The guarantee of a constant price appears to have been a "clause" of the implicit contract from early on; that of constant quality seems to have evolved later on.
<<COMP: Place Table 2 about here>> An alternative interpretation of such advertising materials is that they simply included the price, which happened to be 5¢. However, many of these advertising materials were durable items (e.g., metal signs, metal serving trays, etc.). promised Coca-Cola for 5¢ in the bottle or at the fountain.
Coca-Cola did not remain local to Atlanta for long. A 1906 full-page Cosmopolitan
ad promised it to the entire nation, for "5¢" and "AT ALL FOUNTS AND IN
BOTTLES." Similar 1906 ads ran in American Theater and Country Life in America.
Ironically, given the court battles that followed, the Company also ran ads in 1906 stating that it was "GUARANTEED UNDER THE PURE FOOD AND DRUG ACT." 36 Despite later problems with the USDA, the theme of "guaranteeing purity" became recurrent.
In the early 1900s Coca-Cola faced competition from a myriad of imitators who tried hard to be perceived as close substitutes by consumers. By 1908 the Company was encouraging consumers to "GET THE GENUINE" Coca-Cola. 37 Also, 1912 Coca-Cola ads warned "BEWARE!!! of Imitations" and encouraged consumers to "Demand the complemented each other in an evolving theme of constant quality in the Company's advertising.
During the 1920s Coca-Cola continued to stress the "5¢" price, as in a full-page 1922 ad in The Ladies Home Journal. Then the 1930s witnessed the introduction of the famous "pause that refreshes" slogan. 39 The "pause" had by then been part of consumers' lives for over 50 years; it was "the best friend thirst ever had." The Company stressed a familiarity that would also feed into the evolving theme of constant quality.
In 1941 issues of National Geographic, Boys' Life, Collier's, Life, Time, and the Saturday Evening Post, the "pause that refreshes" was still promised at "5¢," but now there was an additional claim: "You trust its quality." 40 And in a 1942 Saturday Evening
Post the "5¢" and "Delicious and Refreshing" Coca-Cola stated that "Quality carries on."
The guarantee of quality was prominent and the "carries on" implied a commitment to continuity over time. These examples come from print ads because they are the most readily available as facsimiles at the Coca-Cola archives. However, the Company was issuing similar pledges on its durable promotional items (Table 2) . Already in 1887 the Company was distributing 45 tin signs and oil cloth hangers (Allen, 1994, p. 30) . By the early 1920s these materials included 50,000 metal serving trays and 100,000 streetcar signs (Allen, 1994, pp. 167-168) . In 1924 the Company "maintained more than 20,000 painted walls and bulletins throughout the United States" and by the 1930s it also maintained 160,000 billboards across the US (Allen, 1994, p. 206) . 43 These materials continued to remind customers that Coca-Cola still sold for a nickel, while its "quality carries on."
Informing and Convincing Retailers
The Coca-Cola Company also made efforts to inform retailers that it had made an implicit contract with consumers and that it was in their common interest not to break it.
In a 1916 Drug Trade Journal insert during WWI, the Coca-Cola Company told retailers that "Price, quality and advertising will remain the same" and stated: "All we ask of our dealers is the natural and human reciprocity of serving only the genuine and serving it
properly." Presumably, in asking for retailers to "serve it properly," the Company referred to 6.5oz at 5¢, using unadulterated syrup.
By the 1920s the Company was using trade journal inserts to stress the standard 6.5oz
and 5¢ price as something expected by consumers and profitable to retailers. "This Glass increases sales," stated a 1923 insert referring to 6.5oz glasses that could be "bought in make these changes: "I am very leary[;] and much prefer not to do anything of the kind, except as a matter of life and death" (Source: Robert W. Woodruff in a letter to Arthur Acklin, October 2, 1942, Robert W. Woodruff Papers, Special Collections Section, Emory University Library). Since we find no evidence that customers perceived a change in flavor, we suspect that the Coca-Cola Company believed that it had succeeded in keeping quality as constant as its constraints would allow. In making the guarantee of constant quality explicit at this time, the Company also positioned itself so that it was vulnerable to backlash. quantity from your jobber." The insert referred to "The Right Price" of "5¢" which "is the price people expect to pay for Coca-Cola, because it is established by years of custom" Woodruff personally replied to Merritt: "Your comment regarding our product and our
Company describes exactly what has been our desire[.]" ". . . In the recent era of rationing and the subsequent period of high-and rising-costs, the maintenance of the 5¢ price has not been devoid of difficulty, but the compensations that arise from doing so, as exemplified by your friendly remarks, are many and not the least of them is the good will embodied in such expressions as these in your editorial" [our emphasis]. The writer makes an interesting exception for "outlets such as night-clubs [and] cocktail lounges" where enforcing the 5¢ price was not thought to be as important "since the customer expects to pay a premium."
Kelly, head of international operations, concerning the "price situation:" The Company, fearful of the backlash as retailers abandoned the nickel, hired a consulting firm to conduct a survey of retail prices and consumer reaction to price increases in 27 towns.
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Almost all of the Company documents we located focus on the costs of changing the nickel price. What is not found in the internal documents is also notable: any reference at all to altering the Secret Formula or serving size. Recall that both dominant personalities in Coca-Cola's early history-Asa Candler and Robert Woodruff-established that changing the Secret Formula was not on the table. 54 It would have made little sense to elaborate upon the costs of doing something that was essentially taboo.
Renegotiations
The Coca-Cola Company eventually recognized that the nominal nickel price was inconsistent with the realities of the post-WWII inflationary economy. We find some 52 Despite his primary role in international operations, the letter refers entirely to US operations and was copied to President H. Burke Nicholson. 53 Source: Memorandum dated November 7, 1950 from John Toigo, D'Arcy Advertising Company, to H. Burke Nicholson. We located the summary results of one such survey (for Alexandria, LA) in the CocaCola Archives that described "swift public reaction:" "At first, the public bought up all available CocaCola at the old price. As soon as the supply was depleted, [a] boycott was imposed." The summary reported several "typical consumer comments" including: "Buy a Coke? Not me. Haven't had one since the price went up. I'll wait until it comes down." "They will be sorry. I haven't had a Coke all week and I won't until it sells for a nickel." "The bastards! No one buys Coke now." "Coke will be back to a nickel soon. Just wait and see." 54 Kahn (1969, p. 74) These proposals can be interpreted as plans to renegotiate standard prices for CocaCola. We find no evidence that such plans were pursued, but the fact that they were seriously contemplated is itself evidence in favor of an implicit contract's existence.
Relationship between the Implicit and Explicit Contracts
In 1899 the Coca-Cola Company signed over bottling rights for most of the US to Tennessee lawyers, Benjamin Thomas and Joseph Whitehead. 58 They could purchase syrup from the Company at 92¢/gallon in perpetuity. In Levy and Young (2004, pp. 778-782) we argue that a constant retail price could be optimal if Coca-Cola acted like a monopoly in a particular stage of processing where the price of its own output (syrup) 55 In a previous version of this paper, we also argued that the backlash associated with the introduction of "New Coke" in 1985 was evidence of the quality clause and its importance to consumers. The Bottler's incurred a direct loss of $30 million in the form of unsold New Coke inventories according to the Atlanta Journal and Constitution (1995) and Collins (1995) . In that case, the hasty (re)introduction of "Coca-Cola Classic" represented attempts of renegotiations. was fixed. Here we are suggesting an alternative source of price rigidity. However, we believe that the two explanations are related: the contract with bottlers created incentives for the Company to develop and strengthen an implicit contract with its consumers.
In 1900 the original bottling company split into two regional "parent bottlers" (north and south US) that licensed bottling rights to smaller bottlers. Soon the Company was shipping syrup directly to the smaller bottlers. According to Allen (1994, p. 109) , the parent bottlers "took a royalty on every gallon, even though they never handled a drop."
The contract was amended in 1901. The Company agreed to sell syrup to the parent bottlers at $0.90/gallon plus a $0.10/gallon rebate for advertising materials. 59 In that form, the contract lasted until 1921. 60 We know that Coca-Cola was the largest soft drink producer; it had market power based on its brand. Yet it acted as a price-taker for a 20-year period. As long as its profit margin was positive, the Company's profits could increase only by increasing the quantity of syrup sold. The retailers and bottlers, however, were in principle able to exploit the Coca-Cola brand and raise the price on the differentiated product. It would then understandably be in the Company's interest to strip them of their price-setting ability. Forging an implicit contract with consumers-one that included the 5¢ price-may have helped to accomplish this.
Of course, explicit evidence that Coca-Cola tried to deprive retailers and bottlers of price setting ability is hard to come by. As Fortune reported in 1951, "Coke has been charged with coercing its bottlers to stay at the 80-cent case price, but the charge has never been even nearly substantiated." The Company seems to have understood the 59 Source: Thomas Ben, letter to W.D. Boyce, November 15, 1901, "Benwood." 60 In 1921 a new agreement was signed where the Company sold syrup to the parent bottlers at $1.17/gallon plus, for every cent that a pound of sugar rose in excess of 7¢, a 6¢ premium (Pendergrast, 1993, p. 144) . This contract remained unchanged through the demise of the nickel Coke (Johnson, 1987, p. 13 ).
precarious position that such "coercion" could create a legal complication. 
Alternative Explanations for the Episode
In Levy and Young (2004, pp. 789-794) we carefully considered but ultimately ruled out several alternative explanations for the price rigidity of Coca-Cola. These included price points (Kashyap, 1995) and productivity growth that could offset unfavorable changes in market conditions. However, while our previous paper focuses on an explicit contract with bottlers and two "technological" factors, the present discussion of an implicit contract makes it worthwhile to consider two other alternative explanations.
Investing in Brand (Stressing Quality) to Charge Premium Price
A firm may use advertising as a means of product differentiation. Competitors tried to imitate Coca-Cola, believing that they could pass themselves off with similar names. In such settings, firms may use persuasive (rather than informative) advertising to shift consumer preferences and establish or strengthen brand loyalty (Carlton and Perloff, 2005; Bagwell 2007 ) to increase market power (Telser, 1964) . Product differentiation leads to higher profits via higher demand and lower price elasticity, allowing for a premium price to be charged (Waldman and Jensen, 2001, p. 357) . Persuasive advertising can also deter new entry by increasing the costs of inducing consumers to switch from established goods (Bagwell, 2007 (Bagwell, , p. 1715 attached, legal department memo dated January 9, 1947, "5¢ Price for Coca-Cola." However, in the 1950 "Coca-Cola Price Study" a recommendation to bottlers was: "Coca-Cola should be sold as cheaply as possible consistent with profit," which might mean that as long as there's a positive profit margin for bottlers and retailers, keep the price at 5¢; the Company will profit via volume. Also, in a somewhat comical letter drafted to bottlers (attached to an August 23, 1950 letter from vice president H. B. Nicholson to Pope Brock) after seven full pages presenting arguments why the bottler should hold the 80 cent per case wholesale price, on the eighth and final page it states: "In spite of the fact that our business and yours was built on the 80¢ price, we have no sentimental attachment to it, and let me repeat, we have no desire to influence you to maintain it." It is unclear whether or not this letter was ever actually sent to bottlers.
This explanation, however, is inconsistent with the Coca-Cola making the 5¢ price a focal point of advertising. There is ample evidence that advertising containing price information increases the price elasticity of demand. 62 It is also inconsistent with the Company's persistent resistance to retail price increases.
By promoting and pushing the 5¢ price of Coke, the Company conditioned the public to perceive any price hike as unjustifiable. It created a point of extreme price elasticity, effectively limiting its own market power. Thus, the strategy of heavily promoting and committing to the nickel price would be inconsistent with a goal of increasing profits via product differentiation and a lower price elasticity of demand.
Market Penetration through Lower Price
Coca-Cola may have used an "introductory" low price in order to gain a foothold and capture market share by drawing customers from existing firms. In the marketing literature, it is well-known that a low introductory price often employed by entrant firms, creates product awareness and induces consumer trials (Urban and Houser, 1993) .
However, a nickel price policy lasting over 7 decades is inconsistent with this explanation, although the Company undoubtedly pursued some forms of market penetration strategies early on. During 1889-1893, for example, it distributed "tickets" throughout the Atlanta area that, when presented at a fountain, entitled the holder to a complimentary Coca-Cola. This strategy was perceived as effective and subsequently expanded. From 1894 to 1913, about 8.5 million coupons were redeemed by the Company.
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The nickel price, however, was not lower than the prices of similar products at that 62 See, for example, a meta-study conducted by Kaul and Wittink (1995) who considered 18 studies covering a 20-year period. 63 As reflected on in Reviewing a Proud History: "We gave it to hundreds. They learned by doing. Now billions pay for it! 2,400,000,000 drinks a year!" Source: www.thecocacolacompany.com/heritage/pdf/cokelore/Heritage_CokeLore_cocacolasampling.pdf.
time. For example, many soft drinks during the late 1800s, which at the time were often marketed as patent medicine, were selling for 5¢. Other drinks, including beer, coffee, milk, etc., were also selling for a nickel. Indeed, Joseph Biedenharn, the first entrepreneur to successfully bottle Coca-Cola (in Mississippi in 1894), recollected in a 1959 issue of the Coca-Cola Bottler that "soda water bottlers didn't want to bother with it; besides, they, said, the price of Coca-Cola was too high" (Tedlow, 1990, p. 41) . So, the initial pricing of the product does not appear to have been designed to undercut competitors.
More importantly, however, the Company's decision to stick to the nickel price even after becoming the dominant player in the market is inconsistent with this explanation.
Recall that in 1945 the Coca-Cola Company had a 50 percent market share of the $579 million bottled non-alcoholic carbonated beverage industry. Having achieved such dominance, one would expect that the Company would move away from the nickel price and raise it if it followed a market penetration strategy through an introductory low price.
The company, however, maintained the nickel price for another 15 years.
Conclusion: What Do We Learn from the Coca-Cola Case?
We have documented a period of more than 70 years of price and quality rigidity for arguably the world's most widely recognized consumer good. Yet Coca-Cola is still only a single good. Does this case study have broader relevance? We believe it does.
First, it points towards a widespread phenomenon of "customary prices" in the late 19 th and early-to-middle 20 th century US. For example, many food items (e.g., a mug of beer, a cup of coffee, a loaf of bread, a pack of Wrigley's gum, a bar of Hershey's chocolate, etc.) also sold for a nickel for many years. As discussed in Levy and Young (2004) , many US chain stores operating in that period (e.g., Woolworth, Kresge's (Kmart), etc.) were "Nickel" or "Five-and-Dime" stores, selling goods only for 5¢ or 10¢.
Customary prices may be important for explaining why US nominal retail prices were more rigid historically during that period (e.g., Kackmeister, 2007) and implicit contracts may have played a role in their establishment.
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The Coca-Cola implicit contract episode highlights an extraordinarily successful firm that effectively chose to almost entirely forgo nominal price and quality adjustment.
While the implications of costly price adjustment have been widely studied, analyses considering adjustment along other margins are rare. Danziger (2001) and Anderson and Toulemonde (2004) are examples; they consider firm behavior in the presence of both price and quantity adjustment costs. 65 To our knowledge there are no analogous studies that also incorporate quality changes. The Coca-Cola case study highlights the need for empirical studies of costs of adjustment along these margins (e.g., Müller et al., 2007) .
Finally, to our knowledge, this is the first study to offer direct evidence of an implicit contract in a consumer goods market. How prevalent are implicit contracts in such markets? This paper may serve as a guide to developing relevant testable hypotheses to identify such goods. It may also help to design surveys that identify implicit contracts, as in Blinder et al. (1988) . Of course, this paper may also provide impetus to further narrative case studies.
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